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by
LYNN MONTROSS
and
CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA, USMC
Historical Branch, G-3
Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps,
Washington, D. C., 1955
iii
The Inchon Landing was a major amphibious operation, plannedin record time and executed with skill and precision. Even more,it was an exemplification of the fruits of a bold strategy executedby a competent force. The decision to attack at Inchon involvedweakening the line against enemy strength in the Pusan Perimeterin order to strike him in the rear. It involved the conduct of anamphibious attack under most difficult conditions of weather andgeography.
The stakes were high and the risk was fully justified. Had it notbeen for the intervention of the Chinese Communist Army, theoffensive generated by the Inchon attack would have resulted in acomplete victory for our arms in Korea. A study of the record ofthis operation will disclose, with arresting clarity, the decisive powerthat is to be found in highly trained amphibious forces when theirstrength is applied at the critical place and time.
Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,
General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
v
This is the second volume of a series dealing with United StatesMarine Operations in Korea during the period 2 August 1950to 27 July 1953. Volume II presents in detail the operations of the1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as a part ofX Corps, USA, during and immediately following the InchonLanding on 15 September 1950.
In order to tell a complete story of this historic amphibious operation,the authors have described the mobilization of the Marine Corpsreserves to form the components of the Division and Aircraft Wing;the movement to the staging area and the hurried planning for anamphibious landing; the withdrawal of the 1st Provisional Brigadeand Marine Air Group 33 from the embattled Pusan Perimeter toamalgamate with the larger force for D-day at Inchon; the seizureof Seoul and its environs, and finally the withdrawal on 7 Octoberto prepare for the Wonsan operation.
Again, this