Transcriber's Note:
This book was published in two volumes, of which this is the first. The second volume was released as Project Gutenberg ebook #52589, available athttp://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52589
BY
CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U.S.N.
PRESIDENT UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783"
OF "THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS," AND OF A
"LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT"
IN TWO VOLUMES
Vol. I.
FOURTH EDITION.
LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTON
(LIMITED)
University Press:
John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A.
THE present work, like its predecessor, "TheInfluence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783,"is wholly a result of the author's connectionwith the United States Naval War College as lecturerupon Naval History and Naval Tactics.
When first asked to undertake that duty, thequestion naturally arose how to impart to the subjectof Naval History an aspect which, in this veryutilitarian age, should not be open to the readyreproach of having merely archæological interest,and possessing no practical value for men calledupon to use the changed materials of modern navalwar. "You won't have much to say about history,"was then the somewhat discouraging comment of asenior officer of his own service.
In pondering this matter, it occurred to the author—whoseacquaintance with naval history was atthat time wholly superficial—that the part playedby navies, and by maritime power generally, as afactor in the results of history, and as shaping thedestinies of nations and of the world, had received[Pg iv]little or no particular attention. If this were so,an analysis of the course of events through a seriesof years, directed to show the influence of Sea Powerupon History, would at least serve to imbue hishearers with an exalted sense of the mission of theircalling; and might also, by throwing light upon thepolitical bearings of naval force, contribute to givethe service and the country a more definite impressionof the necessity to provide a fleet adequate togreat undertakings, lest, if an occasion should arisefor what he has ventured to call "statesmanshipdirecting arms," we should be found unprepared,through having no sufficient armed force to direct.
In avowing this as the original, and, for a time atleast, almost the sole motive of his work, the authorpractically confesses that he at the beginning had noscientific appreciation or reasoned knowledge of thenaval history of the past. Upon giving this the attentionrequired by his new duties, and collating thevarious incidents with the teachings of recognizedauthorities upon land warfare, he soon came to recognizethat the principles which they claimed to be ofgeneral application in their own specialty receivedalso ample and convincing illustration in naval annals;although the development of the Art of Warat sea has been slower, and is now less advanced,than on shore. This backward result