Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer.
Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which mustnecessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternaland infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved inPart i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in aninfinite number of ways), but only those which are able to leadus, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mindand its highest blessedness.
DEFINITIONS I. By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in acertain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as heis considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.Cor.)
II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that,which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and,which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; inother words, that without which the thing, and which itselfwithout the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
III. By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed bythe mind as a thinking thing.
>>>>>Explanation—I say 'conception' rather than perception,because the word perception seems to imply that the mind ispassive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems toexpress an activity of the mind.
IV. By 'an adequate idea,' I mean an idea which, in so far asit is considered in itself, without relation to the object, hasall the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
>>>>>Explanation—I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude thatmark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the ideaand its object (ideatum).
V. 'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing.
>>>>>Explanation—I say 'indefinite,' because it cannot bedetermined through the existence itself of the existing thing,or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existenceof the thing, but does not take it away.
VI. 'Reality' and 'perfection' I use as synonymous terms.
VII. By 'particular things,' I mean things which are finite andhave a conditioned existence; but if several individual thingsconcur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effectof one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particularthing.
AXIOMS I. The essence of man does not involve necessaryexistence, that is, it may, in the order of nature, come to passthat this or that man does or does not exist.
II. Man thinks.
III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other ofthe passions, do not take place, unless there be in the sameindividual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the ideacan exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies andmodes of thought.
N.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.xiii.
PROPOSITIONS I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a
thinking thing.
>>>>>Proof—Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, aremodes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the natureof God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Cor.). God therefore possesses t