Transcribed from the 1883 Stevens and Sons edition by DavidPrice,
by
RICHARD HARRIS,
barrister-at-law,
author of “hints on advocacy,” etc., etc.
SECOND EDITION.
LONDON:
STEVENS AND SONS, 119, CHANCERY LANE,
Law Publishers and Booksellers.
1883.
p. ivlondon:
bradbury, agnew, & co.,printers, whitefriars.
Considering the enormous interest which the Public have in“a more efficient and speedy administration ofjustice,” I am not surprised that a Second Edition of“Mr. Bumpkin’s Lawsuit” should be called for sosoon after the publication of the first. If any proof werewanting that I had not overstated the evils attendant on thepresent system, it would be found in the case ofSmitherman v. The South Eastern Railway Company,which came before the House of Lords recently; and judgment inwhich was delivered on the 16th of July, 1883. The facts ofthe case were extremely simple, and were as follow:—A manof the name of Smitherman was killed on a level crossing of p.vithe South Eastern Railway Company at East Farleigh, inDecember, 1878. His widow, on behalf of herself and fourchildren, brought an action against the Company on the ground ofnegligence on the part of the defendants. The case in duecourse was tried at the Maidstone Assizes, and the plaintiffobtained a verdict for £400 for herself and £125 foreach of the children. A rule for a new trial was granted bythe Divisional Court: the rule for the new trial was dischargedby the Court of Appeal. The Lords reversed the decision ofthe Court of Appeal, and ordered a new trial. New trialtook place at Guildhall, City of London, before Mr. BaronPollock; jury again found for the plaintiff, with £700agreed damages: Company thereby saving £200. Once more rule for new trial granted by Divisional Court: oncemore rule discharged by Court of Appeal: once more House of Lordsreverse decision of Court of Appeal, and order second newtrial. So p. viithat after more than four years ofharassing litigation, this poor widow and her children are leftin the same position that they were in immediately after theaccident—except that they are so much the worse as beingliable for an amount of costs which need not be calculated. The case was tried by competent judges and special juries; andyet, by the subtleties of the doctrine of contributorynegligence, questions of such extreme nicety are raised that athird jury are required to give an opinion upon the same stateof facts upon which two juries have already decided in favourof the plaintiff and her children.
Such is the power placed by our complicated, bewildering, andinartistic mode of procedure, in the hands of a rich Company.
No one can call in question the wisdom or the learning of theHouse of Lords: it is above criticism, and beyond censure; butthe p. viiiHouse of