TO HERAT AND CABUL
TO HERAT AND CABUL
A STORY OF
THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR
BY
G.A. HENTY
Author of "With Buller in Natal" "At the Point of the Bayonet"
"The Bravest of the Brave" "Won by the Sword" &c.
WITH EIGHT ILLUSTRATIONS BY CHARLES M. SHELDON
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1901
Copyright, 1901, by
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
Published September, 1901
THE CAXTON PRESS
NEW YORK.
In the military history of this country there is no darker page thanthe destruction of a considerable British force in the terrible defilesbetween Cabul and Jellalabad in January, 1842. Of all the wars in whichour troops have taken part never was one entered upon so recklesslyor so unjustifiably. The ruler of Afghanistan, Dost Mahomed, wassincerely anxious for our friendship. He was alarmed at the menacingattitude of Russia, which, in conjunction with Persia, was threateninghis dominions and intriguing with the princes at Candahar. Ourcommissioner at Cabul, Mr. Burnes, was convinced of the Ameer's honestyof intention, and protested most strongly against the course taken bythe Indian government, who determined upon setting up a discreditedprince, who had for many years been a fugitive in India, in place ofDost Mahomed.
In spite of his remonstrances, the war was undertaken. Nothing couldhave been worse than the arrangements for it, and the troops sufferedterribly from thirst and want of transport. However, they reachedCabul with comparatively little fighting. Dost Mahomed fled, and thepuppet Shah Soojah was set up in his place; but he was only keptthere by British bayonets, and for two years he was so protected.Gradually, however, the British force was withdrawn, until only somefive thousand troops remained to support him. Well led, they wouldhave been amply sufficient for the purpose, for though the Afghantribesmen were dangerous among their mountains, they could not fora moment have stood against them in the open field. Unhappily thegeneral was old and infirm, incapable of decision of any kind, and inhis imbecile hands the troops, who in October could have met the wholeforces of Afghanistan in fight, were kept inactive, while the Afghanspillaged the stores with the provisions for the winter, and insultedand bearded them in every way. Thus a fine body of fighting men werereduced to such depths of discontent and shame that when the unworthyorder for retreat before their exulting enemy was given they had lostall confidence in themselves or their officers, and, weakened by hungerand hampered by an enormous train of camp followers, they went as sheepto the slaughter in the trap the Afghans had prepared for them. Itwould almost seem that their fate was a punishment for the injusticeof the war. Misfortunes have befallen our arms, but never one so darkand disgraceful as this. The shame of the disaster was redeemed only bythe heroic garrison of Jellalabad, which, alth